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REMARKS: NEUROSCIENCE, GENDER, AND THE LAW
Stacey A. Tovino, JD, PhD∗
Thank you very much to Jane Moriarty for inviting me to speak
during today’s Neuroscience, Law, and Government Symposium.
As we have seen from the earlier talks today, the burgeoning
neurolaw literature focuses very heavily on the implications of advances
in neuroscience for criminal responsibility, criminal procedure, capital
punishment, national security, and evidence law.1 My passion is civil
and regulatory health law, and what I have been doing over the last
couple of years is examining the ways in which advances in
neuroscience are impacting a range of civil and regulatory health law
issues.2
In my recent research, I have been exploring the legal impact of
advances in the neuroscience of gender, such as whether and how
stakeholders are using recent studies finding structural and functional
differences between male and female brains in an attempt to influence
the law. I also have been examining whether and how stakeholders are
using the neuroscience of both gender-specific and gender-prevalent
health conditions to influence the interpretation of civil and regulatory

∗ Associate Professor of Law and Director, Health Law and Policy Center, Drake University Law
School, Des Moines, Iowa.
1. Videos of the Neuroscience, Law and Government Symposium are available at
http://www.uakron.edu/law/neurosymposium.php.
2. See Stacey A. Tovino, Medico-Legal Issues in Neuroimaging, NEUROETHICS IN PRACTICE
(Martha Farah & Anjan Chatterjee eds., forthcoming 2009); Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and
Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 469 (2009); Stacey A. Tovino,
Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness: Moral Imperative or Legal and Ethics
Failure?, VA. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2009); Stacey A. Tovino, Incidental Findings: A Common
Law Approach?, 15(4) ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 242; Stacey A. Tovino, The Impact of
Neuroscience on Health Law, 1(2) NEUROETHICS 101 (2008); Stacey A. Tovino, Functional
Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (2007);
Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach,
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193 (2007); Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends
and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 44 (2007).
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health law. Today, I am going to explore how stakeholders are using
advances in the neuroscience of three gender-specific and genderprevalent conditions (the postpartum mood disorders, premenstrual
dysphoric disorder, and eating disorders) to secure health care benefits
under group health plans and individual health insurance policies and to
push for the inclusion of these conditions in mental health parity
legislation. More broadly, I hope to show you how neuroscience is
quickly becoming a very important tool in the arsenal of health care
stakeholders and lobbyists, especially those charged with promoting
women’s access to mental health care.
My first example relates to the neuroscience of the postpartum
mood disorders, including postpartum depression and postpartum
psychosis. Many of us are familiar with the Andrea Yates case, in which
a woman from Clear Lake, Texas, drowned her five children in her
bathtub less than seven months after her fifth child was born.3 The Yates
case, at least the first trial, was framed by many criminal law scholars in
terms of the question of whether Andrea knew that what she was doing
was wrong at the time she did it4 and, more importantly, the
appropriateness of using this standard for purposes of determining her
criminal responsibility.5 But for civil and regulatory mental health law
scholars, medical humanists, and many clinicians, the Yates case is cited
more frequently as an example of what can happen when postpartum
mood disorders and other mental health conditions specific to women
are either not recognized or not successfully treated due in part to a
fragmented health care system that traditionally has been uncomfortable
with both mental health conditions (because historically there has been
very little physical evidence of them) and women’s health conditions,
which have been tainted with the legacy of Freud’s hysteria.6

3. Yates v. State of Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
4. See, e.g., Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior
and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L.REV. 67, 75 (2008).
5. See id. at 82-83.
6. See, e.g., Vanora Hundley, Beyond the Andrea Yates Verdict: Women’s Mental Health
and the Law, 17(1) MIDIRS MIDWIFERY DIGEST 135, 136 (2007); Faith McLellan, Mental Health
and Justice: The Case of Andrea Yates, 368(9551) LANCET 1951, 1951 (2006) (noting “[t]he
[Yates] case also highlighted the lack of recognition of the potentially deadly consequences of
postnatal disorders, and the limitations of the justice system in dealing with individuals who are
mentally ill.”); Evelyn G. Kohan, Letter to the Editor, Compassion for Andrea Yates, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2002, at A30 (stating that “[a]s a professional who devotes energy and time educating the
public about women’s mental health, I find [Yates’s guilty verdict] demoralizing; it reeks of the vast
ignorance we have yet to overcome in law and society.”).
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Over the last decade, however, several groups of scientists have
been using neuroimaging in an attempt to provide neuroradiological
evidence of several health conditions specific to women, including the
postpartum mood disorders.7 One small study published ten years ago,
for example, found that the brains of women with postpartum psychoses
looked significantly structurally different than the brains of age-matched
women with non-postpartum psychoses, leading the study authors to
conclude that they had found evidence of subtle, unspecified neurostructural abnormalities in ill mothers and that these abnormalities might
constitute an unspecific vulnerability factor.8
In 2006, a second group of scientists used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the brains of healthy mothers as they
attended audiovisual baby stimuli postpartum.9 The authors found that
the neural networks of healthy maternal women who were hearing
babies cry were closely associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD), suggesting that even the healthy maternal brain may be
“hardwired” for a period of transient OCD that at one time may have
been adaptive, but now may play a role in postpartum illness.10 The
7. See infra text accompanying notes 8-18.
8. See M. Lanczik et al., Ventricular Abnormality in Patients with Postpartum Psychoses, 1
ARCH. WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH 45, 45-47 (1998) (using computed tomography to quantify the
ventricular and cisternal cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) spaces in 14 women, 12 of whom had cycloid
psychoses with postpartum onset; finding that, when compared to age-matched female patients with
cycloid psychoses or bipolar affective disorders outside the puerperium, certain CSF spaces were
significantly larger in the postpartum psychosis group); concluding that, “[t]his finding could reflect
an unspecific brain structural vulnerability marker in some patients with psychoses of the
puerperium,” id. at 45, and that, “[t]he results underline evidence of subtle, unspecific brain
structural abnormalities in patients with postpartum cycloid, and possibly other types of postpartum
psychosis. Such abnormalities might constitute an unspecific vulnerability factor.” Id. at 47.
9. James Swain et al., Functional Neuroimaging and Psychology of Parent-Infant
Attachment in the Early Postpartum, 5 ANNALS OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY S85, S85 (Feb. 28, 2006)
(concluding that, “[f]urther research on families with mental health vulnerabilities, as well as
conditions such as postpartum depression and substance abuse, may yield biological models for
protective and vulnerability factors in human family attachments.”).
10. See Anna J. Abramson, The Postpartum Brain, IV(4) GREATER GOOD MAG. (Spring,
2008), available at http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/greatergood/2008spring/Abramson154.html (last
visited January 20, 2008).
[W]hen parents in the Yale study heard their babies cry, the researchers observed activity
in neural networks closely associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), as
well as in brain areas associated with social emotions such as empathy. Strikingly, it
seemed that listening to their babies cry triggered a deeply anxious neural response even
in parents who hadn't been diagnosed with a psychological problem . . . . The
researchers offer an evolutionary hypothesis for the neural signs of anxiety they saw in
these parents. They believe that, after the birth of a child, a period of high alert may
have helped parents protect their babies from environmental harm in times when this was
a treacherous and all-consuming task . . . . The Yale researchers hypothesize that the
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scientists concluded that further research “may yield biological models
for protective and vulnerability factors in human family attachments.”11
In 2007, scientists used fMRI to compare the brain function of
women with postpartum depression to asymptomatic postpartum female
control subjects.12 Although the scientists stated that it would be
premature to conclude that postpartum depression has a unique
depression phenotype, they thought that functional neuroimaging did
have the potential to identify an empirically-based neural
characterization of postpartum depression.13
In March 2008, scientists published a study that used positron
emission tomography (PET) to measure brain serotonin receptor binding
potential in a small sample of both healthy and depressed postpartum
women.14 The study authors found that postsynaptic receptor binding in
the depressed subjects was reduced 20-28 percent relative to controls
and stated that they hoped their discovery of these altered
neurobiological processes would increase treatment accessibility for
women.15
These are just a few of the neuroimaging studies that have been
designed to investigate the neuroscience of postpartum conditions. In
still other studies, authors have concluded that future neuroimaging
studies may someday provide a method for diagnosing postpartum
healthy maternal brain is hardwired for a period of “transient OCD.” . . . . But, . . . once
mothers are endowed with this kind of neural “machinery,” there's a danger they “could
connect up OCD behaviors with irrational things not for survival.”
Id.
11. Swain, supra note 9, at S85.
12. Michael E. Silverman et al., Neural Dysfunction in Postpartum Depression: An fMRI Pilot
Study, 12(11) CNS SPECTRUMS: INT’L J. NEUROPSYCHIATRIC MED. 853, 853-54(2007).
13. Id. at 861.
[A]lthough it may be premature to conclude that [postpartum depression] is a unique
depression phenotype, these preliminary findings suggest the potential to identify an
empirically based neural characterization of [postpartum depression] that will provide a
necessary cornerstone for developing more targeted, biologically based diagnostic and
therapeutic strategies specific to mood changes as a consequence of reproductive health.
Id.
14. Eydie Moses-Kolko et al., Serotonin 1A Receptor Reductions in Postpartum Depression:
A PET Study, 89(3) FERTILITY & STERILITY 685, 685-87 (2008).
15. Id. at 685-92 (finding that age, time since delivery, and reproductive hormones did not
differ between the healthy and depressed postpartum subject groups, but that postsynaptic receptor
binding in the depressed subjects was reduced 20-28 percent relative to controls, with most
significant reductions in anterior cingulated and mesiotemporal cortices). The authors concluded
that, “[d]iscovery of altered central neurobiological processes in postpartum mood disorders has the
potential to increase treatment accessibility for women with this disorder, raise the importance of
postpartum depression treatment among practitioners, and decrease the stigma of postpartum
depression.” Id. at 685.
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depression16 and may even be used to predict both maternal style, such
as child neglect, and offspring temperament, including depression and
anxiety.17 Today’s scientists continue to use neuroimaging technologies
in an attempt to better understand the brain structure and function of
postpartum women.18
The issue I am currently researching is whether these
neuroscientific advances are impacting the law that governs access to,
treatment of, and payment for women’s mental health conditions. I
started my research by looking at several old judicial opinions and bills
involving postpartum depression. By “old,” I mean older than the last
ten to fifteen years, which is the period in which the majority of these
structural and functional neuroimaging studies have been published.
What I found is that our courts and legislatures tended to find that the
postpartum mood disorders did not have a physiological or an organic
basis.
The 18-year-old case of Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Insurance
Company19 is illustrative. Blake involved a woman named Pam Blake
who sued her health insurance company when it refused to classify her

16. Press Release, National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression,
Pregnancy & Postpartum Depression: New Research Directions, available at
http://www.narsad.org/news/press/rg_2005/res2005-08-09.html (last visited January 20, 2008)
(summarizing recent advances in postpartum depression research, including a neuroimaging study
involving postpartum subjects conducted at the Medical University of South Carolina [MUSC];
stating that the findings from the MUSC research “may provide a method for diagnosing postpartum
depression.”).
17. Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum et al., Feasibility of Using fMRI to Study Mothers Responding to
Infant Cries, 10(3) DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 99, 99-104 (Dec. 30, 1999).
While parenting is a universal human behavior, its neuroanatomic basis is currently
unknown . . . . Future work in this area may help (1) unravel the functional
neuroanatomy of the parent-infant bond and (2) examine whether markers of this bond,
such as maternal brain response to infant crying, can predict maternal style (i.e., child
neglect), offspring temperament, or offspring depression or anxiety.
Id. at 99.
18. Yale Program for Women’s Reproductive Behavioral Health, Research in the Service of
Patient Care, http://www.med.yale.edu/psych/clinics/YBG.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008)
(providing information about the current research projects of the Yale Program for Women’s
Reproductive Behavioral Health, including the “[d]iagnosis and treatment of postpartum depression
through a neuro-imaging research protocol (HIC #9958).”).
This study involves free antidepressant medication and free supportive therapy. Women
must be within the first 3 months postpartum and breastfeeding. Women who are not
experiencing any mood changes after delivery, and are within the first 3 months
postpartum and are breastfeeding, are also needed for our control group. All participants
can earn up to $200.
Id.
19. 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990).

15-TOVINO2_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC

946

4/24/2009 2:47 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[42:941

postpartum depression as a physical illness.20 Both the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida21 and the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals22 had to review the evidence provided about
Pam’s postpartum depression and decide whether she had an organic
physical illness, which would require the defendant insurer to provide a
robust set of health insurance benefits, or whether she had a nervous
disorder, which was subject to a much less desirable benefit set.23
Although several expert and treating psychiatrists and psychologists
testified about Pam’s erratic behavior and thoughts, including her
specific desire to harm her baby within three days of birth, the court
found that none of the experts could provide any physical, chemical, or
hormonal tests or measurements that could prove that Pam had a
physical illness.24 The court thus held that Pam did not have a physical
or organic illness.25 Blake was published in 1990, so it is only about
eighteen years old today.
In the last seven to eight years, however, we have seen a sea of
change in the legal treatment of the postpartum mood disorders. We
now have bills that would prohibit the denial of disability insurance for a
history of postpartum depression.26 We have bills that would require
health care providers to educate new mothers and their families about

20. Id. at 1525-26.
21. See Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331, *1-*13
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 1989).
22. Blake, 906 F.2d at 1525.
23. Blake, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331, at *3-4.
24. Id. at *8 (noting that “[n]either Pam Blake’s serotonin and neopinephrine levels nor her
hormonal levels were ever measured so far as this Court is aware . . . Dr. Moreno’s testimony
simply failed to prove a physical illness caused Mrs. Blake’s psychiatric hospitalization.”). The
11th Circuit adopted the reasoning of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida in rejecting the Blakes’ argument that Pam Blake’s postpartum treatment was covered as a
sickness under the policy. Blake, 906 F.2d at 1527.
As to the argument that Pam Blake's postpartum treatment was covered by the
“sickness” provisions of the policy, a review of the record reveals that the district court
must be affirmed on the findings of fact and reasoning under the proper de novo standard
of review as reflected in its Memorandum Order attached hereto as an Appendix.
Id.
25. Id. at *12 (noting that “[b]ecause of Plaintiffs’ failure to prove an organic causation for
this illness, we find that the treatment Mrs. Blake received is only more convincing proof that she
suffered a mental illness within the terms of the policy.”).
26. See, e.g., H.R. 634, 79th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001). This bill prohibits an
insurer from completely denying disability insurance coverage on the basis of treatment within the
previous five years for depression due to pregnancy, postpartum depression, or menopause. The
insurer may, however, in such circumstances, require a waiver of coverage for disability due to
depression for a period of time not to exceed five years from the date of coverage. Id.
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postpartum depression before they leave the hospital.27 We have bills
that would require the offering of postpartum screening during the first
year of postnatal check-up visits,28 bills that would provide social
services to new mothers suffering from postpartum depression,29 bills
that would increase funding for research on postpartum conditions at the
National Institutes of Health,30 bills that would require States to compile
and synthesize data relating to postpartum depression and psychosis,31
and, of course, bills that would proclaim certain days and months in
certain states as Postpartum Depression Awareness Day32 and Month.33
When I reviewed the legislative findings of many of the early and
approved versions of these bills, I saw that at least part of the impetus
for the new legislation was an improved understanding of the
physiological bases of the postpartum mood disorders. For example, in
a 2003 California bill requesting two state agencies to work together to
improve women’s access to mental health care, the California Assembly
specifically noted that physiological factors are believed to play a role in
postpartum mood and anxiety disorders.34 In a 2000 New Jersey bill
appropriating $50,000 for postpartum depression education, screening,
and treatment, the New Jersey Legislature found that postpartum
depression is the result of physiological reactions to childbirth and that it
involves several physiological disorders, including chemical

27. See, e.g., Mom’s Opportunity to Access Health, Education, Research, and Support for
Postpartum Depression Act (MOTHERS Act), S. 1375, 110th Cong., (2007) (requiring grants that
would “provide education to women who have recently given birth, and their families, concerning
postpartum depression, postpartum mood and anxiety disorders, and postpartum psychosis . . .
before such women leave their birthing centers . . . .”).
28. See id. (requiring grants that would “provide for the screen[ing of] new mothers for
postpartum conditions during their first year of postnatal checkup visits, including the standard 6week postnatal checkup visit”).
29. See id. (requiring grants that would “provide for the delivery of essential services to
individuals with postpartum conditions and their families.”).
30. See id. (being “[a] bill to . . . increase research at the National Institutes of Health on
postpartum depression.”).
31. See, e.g., H.6567, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2001) (Rhode Island House Resolution directing the
Rhode Island Department of Health to establish a panel to compile and synthesize data relating to
postpartum depression and psychosis).
32. See S. Res. 164, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2003) (declaring June 25, 2003, as Postpartum
Depression Awareness Day in the State of New Jersey).
33. See, e.g., Assem. Con. Res. 51, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (proclaiming the month of May
2003 as Postpartum Mood and Anxiety Disorder Awareness Month in the State of California).
34. Id. (providing “WHEREAS, The medical community does not fully understand or
recognize all factors contributing to postpartum mood and anxiety disorders, but it is believed that
these disorders are caused by physiological factors . . . .”).
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imbalances.35 In two 2007 federal bills, Congress admitted that the exact
causes of the postpartum mood disorders are complex and unknown, but
Congress did make references to findings relating to steep and rapid
drops in hormones after childbirth as contributing factors.36
When I dug a little deeper, I found evidence that our federal and
state legislators were exposed to lobbyists and stakeholders who were
familiar with the neuroscience of the postpartum mood disorders and
who were using this science to push their legal agendas. Just as one of
many possible examples, the Postpartum Support International
organization (PSI) issued a position paper that was sent to multiple state
legislatures that relies on contemporary neuroscience to argue for
changes in civil and criminal legislation and the treatment of women
suffering from postpartum conditions.37 PSI specifically argues that the
neuroscience of postpartum depression and psychosis must be conveyed
to legislators, policymakers, and lay juries.38 Without neuroscience, PSI
believes that mentally ill women will not receive equal treatment or
representation under the law and in the courtroom, and that juries will
not be making informed decisions, especially in infanticide cases.39
We see this type of neuroscience-based argumentation not only in
position papers and op-ed pieces, but also in the abstract, summary, and
conclusion sections of scientific research studies and review articles.
For example, a physician author of a review article published in the
American Journal of Psychiatry recently argued that neuroscientific
35. Assem. 2775, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000) (providing that “[t]he Legislature finds and declares
that: (a) Postpartum depression is the name given to a wide range of . . . physiological reactions to
childbirth . . . [and] (b) Postpartum depression is the result of a chemical imbalance triggered by a
sudden dramatic drop in hormonal production after the birth of a baby . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., MOTHERS Act, supra note 27 (providing “[t]he Congress finds as follows: . . .
The causes of postpartum depression are complex and unknown at this time; however, contributing
factors include: a steep and rapid drop in hormone levels after childbirth”); Melanie Blocker-Stokes
Postpartum Depression Research and Care Act, H.R. 20, 110th Cong., (2007) (providing “[t]he
Congress finds as follows . . . The causes of postpartum depression are complex and unknown at
this time; however, theories include a steep and rapid drop in hormone levels after childbirth”).
37. Margaret G. Spinelli, Position Paper on Infanticide Associated with Postpartum Mental
Illness, POSTPARTUM SUPPORT INT’L, http://postpartum.net/resources/healthcare-pros/positionpaper-infanticide/ (last visited January 20, 2008).
38. Id.
39. Id.
Sentences for women who commit infanticide vary remarkably because insanity laws
differ from state to state and lack input from the psychiatric community . . . by
emphasizing punishment rather than prevention and treatment, the U.S. fails to enlighten
society about the impact of mental illness on thought and behavior. We abandon the
mentally ill by leaving decisions for treatment and punishment in the hands of the
judicial system.
Id.
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evidence should be used to eliminate the disparate treatment of ill
mothers under the law and as support for the argument that ill mothers
need treatment, not punishment.40
In addition to the postpartum mood disorders, I am also examining
the changing legal understanding and treatment of other gender-specific
conditions such as premenstrual dysphoric disorder and eating disorders,
which we might call gender-prevalent conditions because girls and
women have them more than boys and men, although their incidence in
boys and men is on the rise.41 Here, neuroscience is impacting the law
in at least two different ways. The first way relates to the way in which
litigants and courts interpret the mental health benefits that are subject to
a state or federal mental health parity legislative or regulatory mandate.
Some background information regarding the mental health parity debate
is necessary before proceeding.42
Although insurance plans initially offered physical and mental
health benefits under the same terms and conditions, many health
insurance plans, including employer-based plans, began reducing their
mental health benefits in the 1970s. Insurers and employers justified
these benefit reductions on the grounds that mental health treatments
were more expensive than treatments for physical illnesses. Patients
with mental health conditions, on the other hand, worried that the stigma
associated with mental illness, as well as their inability to literally prove
the existence of the mental health condition through routine blood, urine,
X-ray, or other diagnostic tests, caused the less comprehensive coverage.
Whatever the cause, the result is what we referred to as a mental health
benefit disparity. Some health insurance plans that cover 365 days of
inpatient care for physical illnesses, for example, might cover only fortyfive days of inpatient care for mental disorders. Plans that provide
40. See Margaret G. Spinelli, Maternal Infanticide Associated with Mental Illness: Prevention
and the Promise of Saved Lives, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1548 (2004) (stating that, “contemporary
neuroscientific findings support the position that a woman with postpartum psychosis who commits
infanticide needs treatment rather than punishment and that appropriate treatment will deter her
from killing again” and that the “absence of formal DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for postpartum
psychiatric disorders promotes disparate treatment under the law”; concluding that, “the psychiatric
community should develop guidelines for the treatment of postpartum disorders, foster sharing of
knowledge between psychiatry and the law, and do more to enlighten society about the effects of
mental illness on thought and behavior so that decisions about the treatment and punishment of
mentally ill persons will not be left exclusively in the hands of the judicial system.”).
41. Margarita Tartakovsky, Eating Disorders in Men, PSYCHCENTRAL, Oct. 7, 2008,
available at http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2008/10/07/eating-disorders-in-men/ (noting that
“[o]ut of 3000 people with anorexia and bulimia, 25 percent were men”).
42. The background information provided in the next five paragraphs is taken from Stacey A.
Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 469 (2009).
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unlimited outpatient visits for treatment of physical illnesses might allow
only twenty outpatient visits for treatment of mental disorders. And
plans that cover all or maybe 80 percent of the cost of treatment for
physical illnesses might cover only 50 percent or less of the cost of
treatment for a mental illness.
In the late 1980s, some patients who were denied additional mental
health benefits responded by suing their insurers, arguing that their
conditions were physical rather than mental in nature and thus covered
under the better set of benefits. In these contract-based lawsuits, the
plaintiffs’ experts routinely referenced advances in the behavioral and
brain sciences to support their testimony. Sometimes the patients won,
sometimes they did not, but the results all depended on whether the
expert witnesses could prove using physical evidence that the plaintiff
had a “real” disease.
Frustrated with these piecemeal lawsuits, many patients and patient
advocacy organizations began in the early 1990s to lobby Congress and
state legislatures for health insurance parity, reasoning that there was no
biological justification for the unequal insurance coverage of mental and
physical conditions by health insurance plans. By the mid-1990s,
proponents of mental health parity had achieved some success at the
federal and state level, including the federal Mental Health Parity Act of
1996,43 which required some, but not all, group health plans to provide
equality for any annual or lifetime aggregate spending caps imposed
within the plan.44 Many states also enacted their own mental health
parity laws, which vary widely in scope. At the heart of all of this
mental health parity legislation is the idea that insurers need to
43. Pub.L. 104-204, Title VII, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996).
44. On October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) into law. H.R. 1424, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 110th Cong. (Oct. 3, 2008). Division C, Title V, Subtitle B of the
EESA contains the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act of 2008 (MHPA’08). Very generally, MHPA’08 builds on the Mental Health Parity Act of
1996 by amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the Public Health Service Act,
and the Internal Revenue Code to require group health plans that provide both medical and surgical
benefits and mental health or substance use disorder benefits to ensure that: (1) the financial
requirements, such as deductibles and copayments, applicable to mental health or substance use
disorder benefits are no more restrictive than the predominant financial requirements applied to
substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan; (2) there are no separate cost
sharing requirements that are applicable only with respect to mental health or substance use disorder
benefits; (3) the treatment limitations applicable to such mental health or substance use disorder
benefits are no more restrictive than the predominant treatment limitations applied to substantially
all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan; and (4) there are no separate treatment
limitations that are applicable only with respect to mental health or substance use disorder benefits.
Id.
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reimburse treatments for mental illnesses in the same way they do for
physical illnesses.
Some state laws define mental health benefits in terms of
conditions listed in the DSM-IV45 or the current version of the ICD,46
both of which identify and classify mental disorders. Some jurisdictions
do this even though the DSM-IV states in its introduction that a mental
condition’s inclusion in the manual should not imply that the condition
meets legal criteria for what constitutes a mental disease, disorder, or
disability, and that there is an imperfect fit between the law on the one
hand and disease classification for clinical diagnostic purposes on the
other.47 The way in which neuroscience is impacting the law here is that
stakeholders are using neuroscientific findings to urge the inclusion of
additional conditions in these classification manuals. Once a condition
is classified in the DSM-IV or the current version of the ICD, many state
laws require health insurance benefit parity for that condition.48
The gender-specific condition of premenstrual dysphoric disorder
(PMDD) is illustrative. PMDD is not currently classified as a mental
disorder in the main part of the DSM-IV, although Appendix B to the
manual does list PMDD as a condition that should be studied further in
the future.49 Stakeholders are using the findings of recent studies
investigating the neuroscience of PMDD, some of which suggest that
PMDD is due, at least in part, to a surge in progesterone during the luteal
phase of the menstrual cycle and related amygdala activation,50 to
support the inclusion of PMDD as a mental disorder in the DSM-IV. If
PMDD is included as a mental disorder in the forthcoming DSM-V,
states that specifically define mental illnesses in terms of the DSM-IV
will require health insurance benefit parity for PMDD treatments.
The second way in which neuroscience is impacting the mental
health parity debate is in states that are less specific and mandate equal
insurance coverage if the mental condition “is caused by a biological

45. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 4th ed., Text Revision
(2000) [Hereinafter DSM-IV].
46. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF
DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS, 10th Rev. (2007) [Hereinafter ICD].
47. DSM-IV, supra note 45, at xxii-xxiii.
48. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-514(a) (2008) (requiring insurance providers to
provide coverage for mental disorders “as defined in the most recent edition of the American
Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,’” excluding less
serious disorders such as caffeine-related disorders).
49. DSM-IV, supra note 46, at 759, 771-774.
50. See, e.g., Joan Arehart-Treichel, Brain Imaging Suggests Origin of Premenstrual
Dysphoric Disorder, 42(18) PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 13 (2007).
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disorder of the brain . . . . ”51 New Jersey is one of these States.52
Nebraska goes one step further and expressly ties its current definition of
serious mental illness to the state of medical science when it requires
benefit parity for “any mental health condition that current medical
science affirms is caused by a biological disorder of the brain.”53 When
a state law expressly refers to the current state of medical science in its
insurance parity mandate, patients, insureds, and other stakeholders are
encouraged to refer to scientific studies that support the classification of
their mental health conditions as biological disorders of the brain.
Stakeholders are thus beginning to refer to scientific studies to
achieve their mental health parity goals. For example, several recent
neuroimaging studies have found structural and functional differences in
the brains of women with both active and recovered eating disorders.54
In some states, lobbyists have referenced these studies en route to
successfully arguing that eating disorders should be included within the
statutory list of mental health conditions that require equal insurance
benefits.55
In summary, I have shown how stakeholders are using advances in
neuroscience to secure health care benefits under health insurance
policies and health plans and to push for the application of mental health
parity legislation. More broadly, though, I hoped to show how
neuroscience is quickly becoming a very important tool in the arsenal of
the health care lobbyist, especially those charged with promoting
women’s access to mental health care. When we have conditions that
are unpopular, as are mental health conditions, or conditions that to this
day are debated, as are many women’s health conditions, neuroscience is
quickly becoming the lobbyist’s and stakeholder’s answer.
The question becomes: How do we assess these neuroscience-based
claims, especially when they are made in the civil and regulatory health
care context as opposed to the criminal context? I have time for two
quick points. First, what gives me cause for pause is not so much the
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-19.7 (1999).
52. Id.
53. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-792(5)(b) (1999).
54. See, e.g., E.K. Lambe et al., Cerebral Gray Matter Volume Deficits after Weight Recovery
from Anorexia Nervosa, 54(6) ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 537 (1997); M. Mühlau et al., Gray
Matter Decrease in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex in Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1850 (2007); Angela Wagner et al., Altered Reward Processing in Women Recovered
from Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1842 (2007).
55. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(d)(8) and (9) (2008) (California’s
mental health parity law provision that mandates equal insurance coverage for a range of severe
mental illnesses, including anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa).
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stakeholders’ use of neuroscience, which I suppose is inevitable, but the
appropriateness of many of the stakeholders’ normative arguments. In
some of these cases, stakeholders are making wonderful arguments that
many of us, or at least some of us, might agree with. Take, for example,
the argument that treatments for postpartum depression should be
covered by health insurance companies in the same way that traditional
physical conditions, such as orthopedic conditions, already are, so that
we can prevent cases like Andrea Yates from happening again. In other
civil and regulatory health care cases, however, I am starting to see a
common argument that every type of structural and functional brain
difference – even differences between men’s and women’s brains in
terms of emotional responses to language and images – is evidence of a
health condition that should be treated and reimbursed and, sometimes, a
disability that requires protected status and benefits under federal and
state disability discrimination and disability benefit law. We need to be
very careful here. Many structural and functional differences are just
that – differences. They are differences that may be individual
differences, characteristic differences, or adaptation differences, but they
are not necessarily evidence of an illness for which treatment is
medically necessary and for which payment must be made by our
commercial and public health insurance plans. I anticipate that our
judges and juries will be left to determine whether many of these
structural and functional differences are health conditions to which legal
protections and benefits should flow, even though our non-scientifically
and non-clinically trained judges and jurors are perhaps the least
equipped to do so.
Second, just as in criminal law, we have a number of relevance and
reliability problems when we start using neuroscience-based arguments
in the civil and regulatory health care contexts. Just as one example,
almost all of the postpartum studies I referenced in this talk were very
small studies, most with less than fifteen ill mothers and an equal
number of healthy postpartum controls. When a non-scientifically or
non-clinically trained stakeholder relies on a scientific study to make a
legal argument, I can almost guarantee you that there are going to be a
few errors in translation.

